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Abstract
The adoption of effective fisheries conservation and management measures ('CMM') represents a critical
stage in the process of sustainably managing global fishing stocks. It represents the point at which
scientific data is integrated with law and policy considerations to generate concrete rules designed to
constrain the behaviour of fishers and other stakeholders in order to promote desired conservation goals
within a fishery. This paper will examine the fisheries CMM process within the broader framework of
international law and policy for marine resource governance. It will consider transparency aspects at key
stages of the CMM process including the gathering and sharing of data upon which measures are based,
the tabling and negotiation of new measures in RFMO meetings, through to the monitoring and
enforcement of CMM to ensure their implementation. At each stage, the paper will seek to explore the
potential for transparency initiatives to improve the effectiveness of fisheries CMM in promoting desired
conservation and management goals within a fishery.
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Transparency in fisheries conservation and management measures
Ruth A. Davis *, Quentin Hanich
Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security (ANCORS), University of Wollongong, Australia

A B S T R A C T

The adoption of effective fisheries conservation and management measures (‘CMM’) represents a critical stage in the process of sustainably managing global fishing
stocks. It represents the point at which scientific data is integrated with law and policy considerations to generate concrete rules designed to constrain the behaviour
of fishers and other stakeholders in order to promote desired conservation goals within a fishery. This paper will examine the fisheries CMM process within the
broader framework of international law and policy for marine resource governance. It will consider transparency aspects at key stages of the CMM process including
the gathering and sharing of data upon which measures are based, the tabling and negotiation of new measures in RFMO meetings, through to the monitoring and
enforcement of CMM to ensure their implementation. At each stage, the paper will seek to explore the potential for transparency initiatives to improve the effec
tiveness of fisheries CMM in promoting desired conservation and management goals within a fishery.

1. Introduction
The adoption of effective fisheries conservation and management
measures (CMMs) by regional fisheries management organisations
(RFMOs) represents a critical stage in the process of sustainably man
aging global fish stocks. It represents the point at which scientific data is
integrated with law and policy considerations to generate concrete rules
designed to constrain the behaviour of fishers and other stakeholders in
order to promote desired management and conservation goals within a
fishery [1]. Mora et al. state that “the conversion of scientific advice into
policy, through a participatory and transparent process, is at the core of
achieving fisheries sustainability, regardless of other attributes of the
fisheries.” [2].
Transparency can play a role in key aspects of the CMM process, from
the gathering and sharing of data upon which CMMs are based, the
process of negotiating new CMMs, through to the monitoring and
enforcement activities that ensure implementation of, and compliance
with, CMM. Transparency in this context refers to the openness and
accessibility of information and decision-making procedures, both
within the RFMO and in relation to non-members, and the degree to
which public participation is supported. The aim of this paper is to
explore the potential value of transparency measures at each stage in the
development of effective fisheries CMM by an RFMO; to consider the
type, quality and availability of information that is necessary for
decision-makers to adopt effective CMM; to consider the impact of
transparency on the process by which CMM are proposed, discussed and
adopted; and the potential impact of transparency initiatives at the

monitoring and enforcement stage. After discussing the international
policy framework surrounding transparency principles, this paper will
examine various stages in the process of developing and implementing
fisheries CMMs from a transparency perspective. It will then offer some
conclusions on the role of transparency in the process of adopting
effective fisheries CMMs by RFMOs.
1.1. Background and context
Access to transboundary natural resources such as fisheries resources
entails international responsibility and an obligation to pursue inter
nationally agreed sustainability targets [3]. Consideration of this
broader context is helpful in highlighting the significance of trans
parency principles for decisions about resource use at the international
level. It clarifies the basis for pursuing greater transparency in fisheries
governance, and the potential limits or pitfalls that should be guarded
against to make sure that, in seeking greater transparency, we are not
creating further problems.
The overarching international policy framework for natural resource
management is provided by the United Nations Sustainable Develop
ment Goals (SDGs), an ambitious plan to end poverty, protect the planet
and advance peace and prosperity for all [4]. Three of the SDGs in
particular are important for setting fisheries CMMs. SDG 14, “Life Below
Water”, calls for the harvesting of marine resources to be effectively
regulated and an increase in the economic benefits from sustainable use
of marine resources to accrue to less developed countries and small is
land developing States. SDG 16 “Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions”,
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amongst other things, requires the development of “effective, account
able and transparent institutions at all levels”. SDG 17, “Partnership for
the Goals”, targets enhanced policy coherence (17.14), the sharing of
knowledge and other resources (17.16), and the increased availability of
“high quality, timely and reliable data” (17.18) in support of sustainable
development.
Alongside these broad sustainable development goals exists the in
ternational legal framework for fisheries management, set down largely
in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) [5]
and the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) [6] under
which primary responsibility for establishing international fisheries
CMMs rests with RFMOs. As recently as December 2019 the United
Nations General Assembly has urged RFMOs “to improve transparency
and to ensure that their decision-making processes are fair and trans
parent and facilitate the adoption of conservation and management
measures in a timely and effective manner” [7]. Certain aspects of RFMO
decision-making procedures are targeted by the General Assembly’s
comments, which specifically identified “provisions for effective voting
and objection procedures”, reliance on “best scientific information
available”, the incorporation of precautionary and ecosystem ap
proaches, and provisions addressing participatory rights as requiring
particular attention [8]. On a separate but related matter, the General
Assembly also highlighted “the importance of ensuring transparency of
reporting of fishing activities within regional fisheries management or
ganisations and arrangements in order to facilitate efforts to combat
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing …” [9].
Transparency is referenced both directly and indirectly in the un
derlying framework of international fisheries law. Under Article 61 of
the LOSC, coastal States must ensure that the living resources of their
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are not over-exploited, through proper
CMM based on the best scientific evidence available to them. While
transparency is not explicitly identified as a requirement for a CMM to
be “proper”, the importance of adequate information for decisionmaking is recognized in Article 61(5) which requires the regular
sharing and exchange of relevant data including scientific information,
catch and effort statistics. Transparency is a key characteristic of any
such process.
The LOSC also requires coastal States and high seas fishing States to
cooperate in developing CMM that apply to straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory species [10]. Implementation of this obligation to
cooperate is facilitated by the UNFSA under which the cooperative
gathering and sharing of data is promoted and transparency principles
thereby implicitly endorsed.
For example, UNFSA requires that cooperating States “adopt mea
sures to ensure long-term sustainability of … stocks and promote the
objective of their optimum utilization”; based on the “best scientific
evidence available”, and to “collect and share, in a timely manner,
complete and accurate data concerning fishing activities … as well as
information from national and international research programmes”
[11]. Furthermore, States are to apply a precautionary approach in
relation to the conservation, management and exploitation of stocks and
in so doing are to improve their decision-making by obtaining and
sharing the best available scientific information [12].
UNFSA goes further than this however and, under Article 12, im
poses clear requirements with regard to transparency in RFMO decisionmaking. This obliges States to ensure transparency in the activities and
deliberations of RFMOs and includes making provision for representa
tives from other relevant organisations to effectively participate in
RFMO processes, as observers or otherwise. International fisheries law
therefore includes important transparency obligations that apply both to
information sharing and disclosure, and to openness in decision-making,
in relation to the development of fisheries CMM.

is ‘good’: “The importance ascribed to transparency is reflected in its
near universal appearance in codes of conduct and best practices that
have emerged since the 1990s” [13]. There are several dimensions to the
perceived value that transparency adds to the decision-making process.
First there is a general understanding that transparency facilitates access
to more information and an assumption that this will lead to better
quality decisions (and better conservation outcomes) [14]. In this re
gard, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Devel
opment states that “Environmental issues are best handled with the
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant level … States
shall facilitate and encourage public awareness by making information
widely available.” [15].
Second, it is assumed that a more transparent process will improve
equity by mitigating power imbalances and enabling a more equitable
distribution of conservation benefits and burdens, not just for now but
into the future as well [16]. Equity is a key component of sustainable
development, Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration stating that “the right to
development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental
and environmental needs of present and future generations”, and Prin
ciple 6 giving priority to “the special situation and needs of developing
countries.” [17] In the development of fisheries CMMs, UNFSA explicitly
requires that “States shall take into account the special requirements of
developing States, in particular … the need to ensure that such measures
do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate
burden of conservation action onto developing States” [18].
Third, more equitable CMM are likely to be more effectively imple
mented. Greater transparency is likely to engender greater trust in CMM
negotiations and outcomes and greater support for their implementa
tion. As Costanza et al. note, “Full stakeholder awareness and partici
pation contributes to credible, accepted rules that identify and assign the
corresponding responsibilities appropriately.” [19] And fourth, trans
parency can be important for maintaining the ongoing legitimacy of
RFMO management and the approval of their activities by stakeholders
and the broader community.
This fourth dimension invokes the concept of a Social License to
Operate (SLO) and is increasingly relevant in relation to RFMOs and to
the management of industrial fishing operations more generally. Voyer
and van Leeuwen [20] point out that third parties are increasingly able
to direct critical attention to areas of concern, including the social and
environmental impacts of industrial activities, using social media and
the internet to access information and mobilise political action.
While Voyer and van Leeuwen are primarily concerned with fishing
operations in the national and sub-national context, notable examples
exist of third parties exerting pressure on international management
organisations and RFMOs in response to dissatisfaction with their per
formance. One example of this can be seen in the Southern Ocean fish
eries for Patagonian toothfish in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources
(CCAMLR) was struggling to address high levels of illegal, unreported
and unregulated (IUU) fishing that were threatening the long term
sustainability of these fisheries. In response, a group of industry and
environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) collaborated to
establish the International Southern Oceans Longline Fisheries Infor
mation Clearing House (ISOFISH) [21]. ISOFISH successfully exposed
many of the actors involved in the IUU fisheries and drew attention to
the threat posed by IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean, thereby creating
significant pressure on CCAMLR parties to take further action [22].
During this period, further pressure was brought to bear by the in
ternational environmental NGO, Greenpeace. In 1999 and 2000
Greenpeace launched two expeditions to the Southern Ocean by its
vessel MV Arctic Sunrise, resulting in the high profile pursuit of a sus
pected IUU vessel that ended in Mauritius where the vessel was pre
vented from landing [23]. Information collected from these expeditions
was submitted to CCAMLR and other international organisations.
Informed by these various exposes, the Australian Government and
others advocated strongly in CCAMLR for the adoption of measures to

1.2. Why is transparency important in CMM decision-making?
In civil society there is a general acknowledgment that transparency
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combat IUU fishing, including the introduction of a Catch Documenta
tion Scheme to eliminate market access for IUU catches. In 1999,
Australia warned CCAMLR members that failure to respond effectively
to the threat of IUU fishing would damage CCAMLR’s reputation [24].
The Catch Documentation Scheme was subsequently adopted by
CCAMLR and implemented in 2001 [25].
External pressure on CCAMLR to further strengthen its measures
against IUU fishing was maintained through an additional NGO and
industry campaign to list Toothfish under appendix II of the Convention
on the International Trade in Endangered Species [26]. The Australian
government supported the campaign and tabled a proposal to CCAMLR
in 2002 [27]. While the proposal was ultimately unsuccessful, it further
exposed CCAMLR decision-making to international scrutiny and main
tained pressure for CCAMLR to act decisively. Similar narratives exist for
other international fisheries, including the management of Atlantic
Bluefin tuna by the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) [28]; these cases illustrate the importance of
maintaining stakeholder approval for RFMO operations and the role of
transparency in maintaining the legitimacy of fisheries management
processes.

around resource-use decision-making will automatically lead to
improved environmental outcomes must also be carefully examined.
The impact of greater transparency upon environmental decisionmaking will depend upon relevant users having “access to and literacy
regarding this information”, and upon the decision-maker being
“responsive and vulnerable to accusations of poor sustainability per
formance” [33]. For example, decision-makers typically require timely,
synthesised information that is readily digestible by non-specialists.
Provision by researchers of more information, particularly information
that is more extensive and detailed than necessary, will be unlikely to
improve decision-making. Accessibility and information literacy are
therefore important considerations, ensuring not only that
decision-makers have the information they require, but also that it is
available in a format that is useful to them [34].
There also exists the more general problem of either too much in
formation, or of misinformation and disinformation. As noted by Mol,
“[i]n a disinformation age, information is out of control through over
loads, misinformation and disinformation … Especially if we fail to have
powerful, legitimate, and widely accepted institutions that can be trus
ted to distinguish true from false information and that can help us to
prioritize valuable above less valuable information, transparency can
become the victim of its own success and disempower itself.” [35]
Although ‘disinformation’ might simply be an unintended consequence
of increased transparency, it could also be part of a deliberate strategy to
confuse and thereby disempower civil society and other actors [36].
Therefore care must be taken in implementing transparency re
quirements to ensure that equity goals are met and that enhanced
availability of information actually leads to better resourcemanagement decisions. With these limitations in mind, the next sec
tion of the paper examines key stages of the process of developing and
implementing fisheries CMM to consider where transparency obliga
tions best fit and the potential impact of transparency measures, both
good and bad.

1.3. Recognising the limitations of transparency
Transparency cannot be viewed in isolation, however, and must be
considered within the context of the whole CMM process. It is important
that transparency obligations be implemented thoughtfully to ensure
that the CMM process is actually enhanced [29]. Increased transparency,
with implications for privacy and for control of information, could
actually work to reduce the quality and fairness of CMM decisions.
While greater transparency is generally assumed to empower the less
powerful, transparency requirements can sometimes exacerbate power
imbalances, thereby furthering rather than reducing inequality [30].
Careful consideration of the context of each negotiation, the parties and
the purpose of particular deliberations, will be required in order to
determine the impact of transparency on equity outcomes.
For example in the context of Pacific Ocean tuna fisheries, the only
way that small island developing States (SIDS) can effectively negotiate
with large economies such as the US or China is by forming a coalition.
Seto and Hanich discuss the impact of various negotiating tactics upon
deliberations of the annual meetings of the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) [31]. Collective negotiating strategies
have been used successfully in the past by Pacific SIDS, requiring some
level of confidentiality in negotiations in order for coalition parties to
develop their collective strategy. In these circumstances, reduced levels
of transparency can improve equity outcomes for developing States by
counteracting existing power imbalances.
Confidentiality at the plenary level in the same forum can however
have significant adverse equity impacts. For example, Seto and Hanich
discuss one occasion where the US pushed for negotiations to proceed as
a closed discussion involving only Heads of Delegations (HODs). In this
scenario, capacity constraints place the SIDS at a considerable disad
vantage [32]. If negotiations are closed to all but the HODs, then dele
gations are unable to make use of the expert knowledge of advisers upon
whom they commonly rely. Accountability is further challenged by the
potential for a powerful State to indicate support for a particular posi
tion across the floor of the plenary, but then argue a contrary position
within the confines of a confidential HOD negotiation. This type of tactic
can be particularly difficult for the developing State HOD, operating
with limited resources, to effectively counter. These scenarios illustrate
how confidentiality in preparing for RFMO discussions can enable
developing States to form negotiating coalitions that help to reduce
power disparities. However, confidentiality in the RFMO plenary can
reduce accountability and reinforce power disparities by limiting the
participation of relevant stakeholders and experts who can support
developing State delegations to best represent their own interests.
The assumption that strengthening transparency requirements

2. Opportunities for greater transparency at key stages in the
CMM process
2.1. Transparency in relation to the gathering and sharing of data
How much, and what, information is necessary for an RFMO to have
in order to adopt effective CMMs? It is generally assumed that more
information will lead to better decisions, but it is unrealistic to assume
that we can make fisheries management decisions in an environment of
full information. Instead, strategic choices need to be made about the
type, quality and quantity of information upon which we are prepared to
make a decision and be satisfied that the decision is the best one that we
can make.
In terms of the type of information necessary for the adoption of new
fisheries CMMs, some guidance can be gleaned from the LOSC re
quirements for coastal States in relation to their EEZ obligations. Article
61(3) of the LOSC requires coastal States to design measures that will
maintain or restore target stocks to MSY, but also take into account
relevant environmental and economic factors relating to the ecosystem
and the fishery. Further, in giving effect to their duty to cooperate in
order to conserve straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the
UNFSA requires States to apply an ecosystems-based and precautionary
approach, take measures to eliminate excess fishing capacity and take
into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers [37].
From these requirements, we can identify five broad types of infor
mation that are important for fisheries management: biological, abiotic,
operational, economic and social science/development information. In
relation to this information there are two levels to transparency: first,
whether the information exists in the first place, and second, whether
(and to whom) that information is accessible.
Biological information is necessary for the ecosystem based approach
to management that is implicit in the LOSC and clearly mandated in the
3
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UNFSA. The complexity and unpredictability of interactions between
environmental drivers and pressures means that it is critical to consider
if sufficient information has been incorporated into the predictive model
or stock assessment when making decisions based upon biological in
formation [38]. Biological information tends to exist for commercially
valuable species, however if it has been collected under privatized
research for the fishing industry it may be protected as ‘commercia
l-in-confidence’. A lot of information exists, but it is not always generally
accessible. This characteristic could have negative implications for
ecosystems and species that do not have commercial value. In this
context it is possible that transparency initiatives could exacerbate any
information imbalance and detract from an ecosystems approach.
Abiotic factors are increasingly important for decisions concerning
preemptive fisheries management strategies in light of climate change
impacts such as ocean acidification and altered patterns of global cur
rents. Abiotic information can be subdivided into seascape information,
generally more important for management of benthic organisms and
nearshore fishing, and water quality characteristics, which are more
important for decision-making regarding high seas and migratory
pelagic species. While abiotic information is generally available, it can
be expensive to maintain so that data remains current.
Fisheries management decisions must take into account broader
operational, economic and social factors if they are to effectively
manage a fishery. Understanding the operation of a fishery – where
vessels fish, how they fish, what gear they use, when and where trans
shipments and landings occur, supply chains and so on – is critical for
maximizing the effectiveness of management decisions while at the
same time minimizing the impacts on the profitability of fishing oper
ations. For example, it is inefficient to impose a closure on an entire
fishery if it is only one type of fishing gear that is problematic.
Economic information is particularly important for harvest strategies
where managers seek to determine target reference points that, for
instance, generate the most profitable catch per unit effort (CPUE)
within the fishery’s limit reference points (usually maximum sustainable
yield or MSY). The target can be hard to determine because one fisher
may be profitable at a designated level while another is making a loss.
Transparency is crucial in this scenario because a manager needs to
know, for example, if one fisher’s ‘profitable’ CPUE is actually only
profitable because of subsidies. Economic information is typically
available to industry and would be critical information for managers,
however is it also important for members of the public more generally?
Industry is understandably reluctant to share commercially sensitive
information and indeed perhaps there is no substantial benefit to having
certain types of information openly available and we should instead be
thinking about different levels of transparency for different types of
information.
Finally, there is increasing recognition of the importance of ‘social
science’ or ‘development’ type information for good decision-making in
resource conservation and management. Bennett at al [39] identify a
number of social sciences relevant to the making of effective fisheries
CMMs, including cultural relationships with nature and resources,
human interactions with nature, politics, and psychology and law
(relating to support, trust and compliance), in their review of the human
dimensions in conservation. Social science and development data is
increasingly available, however the disconnect between conservation
science and social science makes it difficult to harness available infor
mation for effective decision-making. Social science is also generally
stronger and more comprehensive in regions with greater economic
means and this uneven distribution of information has social justice
implications where the availability of comprehensive information is
reflective of regions and resources which are already advantaged.
While the availability of these different types of information varies, a
further issue is the accessibility of available information to decisionmakers and to others. In this regard, digitization is a critical feature
and fundamental to the challenge of improving the accessibility of in
formation. It is still the case that significant fisheries data is only

collected in paper form, which in practice makes it unavailable to most
decision-makers in a timely and practical way. Power imbalances occur
when wealthier nations are able to access and refer to digitized data
during RFMO meetings while debate continues on a particular CMM.
Countries that are unable to access such data are likely to remain sus
picious in relation to the CMM proposal and, without being able to make
their own judgments regarding the costs and benefits of any proposal,
are likely to vote ‘no’. Improvements to the process of gathering and
sharing data upon which decisions regarding CMM are made therefore
have the potential to significantly improve conservation and equity
outcomes. This would include the collection of data in electronic format
where possible and the investment in a digital platform that allows ac
cess to data for analysis in real time.
2.2. Transparency in relation to negotiation and decision making upon
CMM
Transparency aspects of CMM negotiations center around who can
participate in the negotiations and the extent to which RFMO de
liberations are made public. Mora et al.’s study of the Management
Effectiveness of the World’s Marine Fisheries[40] suggests that trans
parency at this stage of the RFMO management process is perhaps the
most critical to the overall success of CMMs in securing sustainable
fisheries and acts as a ‘bottleneck’ in relation to conservation perfor
mance. They state:
“Of all management attributes analyzed (ie scientific robustness,
policymaking transparency, implementation capability, fishing capac
ity, subsidies, and access to foreign fishing) plus taking into account
country wealth, we found that variations in policymaking transparency
led to the largest difference in fisheries sustainability.” [41].
This finding reflects the key role played by fisheries CMM negotia
tions in translating robust science into concrete actions. The manner in
which negotiations are conducted, and the extent of participation and
discussion, have a significant impact on the extent to which scientific
advice is adopted and acted upon, or instead overridden for political or
other reasons. Mora’s study also found that transparent and legitimate
participation in policymaking promotes compliance with CMM, even
where enforcement capacity is weak: “If the policy making process is
participatory and legitimate, it is likely that even poorly enforced sys
tems will move towards sustainability because of voluntary compli
ance.” [42].
Webster’s analysis of the performance of ICCAT in relation to man
agement of Atlantic bluefin tuna [43] highlights the critical role played
by the RFMO in translating scientific advice into effective CMMs.
Webster details a history of failure by the RFMO to set and enforce catch
limits at levels recommended by ICCAT scientists, and notes that the
Commission was finally prompted into taking action in response to
moves (albeit ultimately unsuccessful) to have international trade in the
species regulated under CITES [44]. In this scenario, the importance of
publicly available information on key factors including the status of the
stock, the scientific committee’s recommendations, the ICCAT’s rec
ommended measures and actual catch levels, is highlighted. The avail
ability of such information gave strength to efforts by certain
governments [45] and NGOs to utilize the CITES process to improve
conservation outcomes for the species.
In considering the role of transparency requirements in relation to
CMM negotiations, it is important to recognize that CMMs can be
negotiated in different circumstances and these will give rise to different
transparency considerations. Broadly speaking, CMMs can be divided
into pre-emptive measures and ‘other’ measures. Pre-emptive (or pre
cautionary) measures include the development of harvest control stra
tegies and reference points. This type of CMM is more conducive to a
fully transparent decision-making process because ultimately their
effectiveness depends only on the transparency of scientific inputs. The
decision-making framework is agreed in advance in circumstances that
are less likely to be politically charged. Other measures can be
4
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negotiated in circumstances that are more fraught – situations of ur
gency, for example, and perhaps involving multiple stakeholders and
multiple impacts. In these circumstances, a lack of transparency can
result in a lack of trust amongst negotiating parties and this can block
the reaching of agreement. If delegations are unable to properly analyse
what is going on at the meeting, the likelihood of reaching agreement is
greatly reduced.
There are a number of factors that influence the degree of trans
parency in fisheries CMM negotiations [46]. These include:

conditions, developments in scientific understanding and fluid political
context. Furthermore, fisheries management problems are “collective
action problems” requiring the cooperation of many different actors to
solve. The importance of having a shared understanding, between
stakeholders of greatly varying size and expertise, must be recognized.
In this context, transparency is important both in relation to access to
information and participation in the decision-making process. However,
transparency needs to be approached strategically – who are we being
transparent for, and why? Pursuant to the UNFSA, coastal and high seas
fishing States, through RFMOs, are obliged to undertake precautionary
and science-based decision-making in relation to the fisheries they are
managing. Transparency has an important role to play in ensuring
accountability and participation. However there are circumstances
where confidentiality may sometimes be required in order for the RFMO
to make decisions that comply with their obligations, for example, to
ensure equity. Whilst transparency in CMM decision-making should be
the default position, further work could be undertaken to determine
when confidentiality and other limits to transparency better serve the
requirements of UNFSA and sustainable management.

� Who is allowed in the negotiating room? As well as the RFMO
member States, should representatives of other RFMOs, environ
mental NGOs, industry associations, civil society, media, or indeed
any interested party be permitted to be present?
� Once in the room, what are those representatives allowed to do? Can
they simply observe? Can they take notes or interact with delega
tions? Can they ask questions or participate in debates directly? Can
they communicate with the outside world, eg through live Facebook
updates or a Twitter feed?
� Will the proceedings be made public, either contemporaneously (eg
through a livestream broadcast) or later (eg by recording sessions
and allowing access to recordings, transcripts or reports). If access to
proceedings is made public, there is anecdotal evidence to suggest
that it can be both good and bad in terms of equity and conservation
outcomes. While open proceedings might discourage bullying and
similar abuses of power, it might also discourage bargaining and
stifle debate.
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Effective fisheries CMMs require mechanisms for monitoring their
implementation and ensuring their compliance. Transparency has an
important role in relation to compliance and enforcement data, not only
for reasons of assessing the effectiveness of CMMs but also for main
taining the reputation and legitimacy of the RFMOs themselves. There
are significant developments in relation to the use of technology in
fisheries monitoring and enforcement and also in relation to the devel
opment of civil society and industry schemes designed to implement full
traceability of fisheries products in order to ensure compliance with
CMM.
The implementation of monitoring and compliance schemes within
RFMOs has typically been a difficult and contentious process, with the
need to balance transparency gains against the confidentiality re
quirements that have enabled members to submit the necessary moni
toring and compliance data. For example, the Compliance Monitoring
Scheme within the WCPFC is not transparent; there are no observers and
the information is protected behind a firewall. Some of the recent de
bates about the operation of the WCPFC scheme highlight the need to be
clear about the reasons for seeking greater transparency, as these have
implications for what should be transparent and to whom. The Forum
Fisheries Agency, for example, tabled a proposal to amend the compli
ance monitoring scheme to remove vessel-level scrutiny and replace it
with “a broader [member]-level view of their overall implementation of
obligations.” [47] The aim of the proposal was to streamline the
compliance monitoring scheme and to better reflect the purpose of that
scheme, which is to monitor member State implementation of CMMs
rather than individual vessel compliance [48].
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